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Do Only-children Have Poor Vision? Evidence from China’s 
One-Child Policy 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines whether only-children have poor vision by exploiting the 
quasi-natural experiment generated by the Chinese One-Child Policy. The results 
suggest that being an only-child increases the incidence of myopia by 9.1 percentage 
points. We further investigate the mechanisms through which being an only-child 
affects the myopia and find that only-children, as the only hope in a household, 
receive higher expectations in terms of academic performance and future educational 
attainment and pressure to succeed in life from parents, which contribute to the 
increased myopia. We also find that the school quality of only-children is significantly 
higher than that of non-only-children. This study provides new insights into an 
important health consequence of One-Child Policy in China. 
Keywords: Myopia; One-Child Policy; Educational pressure; China 
JEL: J13; I12 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The quantity-quality model of Becker and Lewis (1973) suggests that decreases in the 
quantity of children will induce more resources to be allocated to each child so that 
the average child quality will increase. A large number of empirical studies have 
found a significant trade-off between the number of children and child quality, in 
terms of educational attainment and health, in China (Li et al., 2008; Rosenzweig and 
Zhang, 2009; Liu, 2014). However, recently, a few studies have investigated the 
undesirable consequences of being an only-child. For instance, they find that 
only-children are less trusting, less trustworthy, more risk-averse, less competitive, 
more pessimistic, and less conscientious (Cameron et al., 2013). Only-children are 
more depressed and less happy (Park and Wu, 2016) and have higher probability of 
being overweight or obese (Zhang et al., 2016). In this paper, we focus on another 
important health consequence of being an only-child, i.e., short-sightedness or myopia. 
Specifically, this paper relates the rising prevalence of myopia and the growing 
number of only-children induced by One-Child Policy, providing new insights into an 
important health consequence of One-Child Policy in China. 
   Myopia, known as short-sightedness, causes difficulty in seeing distant objects. 
The costs of myopia are considerable. First of all, myopia is associated with 
substantial direct out-of-pocket expenditure (Zheng et al., 2013). Moreover, poor 
vision negatively affects the academic performance and mental health of students 
(Glewwe et al., 2016; Yi et al., 2015) and it may further affect adult productivity. 
Myopia is common in school-aged children, particularly in Asia. China is one of the 
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countries with the highest myopia rate in the world, which poses a major health 
problem. More importantly, myopia has risen dramatically in China recently. As 
shown by the National Survey on the Constitution and Health of Chinese Students, the 
prevalence of myopia in junior high school students increased by more than 25 
percentage points over the last two decades, from 41.42% in 1995 to 67.33% in 2010 
(see Figure 1). A large number of studies have attempted to investigate the driving 
forces of the epidemic. For example, Morgan et al. (2012) find that the rising 
prevalence of myopia is associated with increasing educational pressures, combined 
with life-style changes, which have reduced the time children spend outside. The lack 
of exposure to bright light outdoors most often causes myopia. However, the causes of 
the rising educational pressures have not been investigated yet in the literature. In this 
paper, we examine whether the One-Child Policy initiated in 1980 in China is 
responsible for the increasing educational pressures and thus the rising prevalence of 
myopia in China.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 Both genetic and environmental factors contribute to the development of myopia. 
Ethnicity plays a role in the occurrence of vision problems. Asian, Hispanic children 
are found to have higher prevalence of myopia than black and white children 
(Rudnicka et al., 2010). Moreover, children with myopic parents are at higher risk of 
developing higher degree of myopia than those with no parental myopia (Lim at el., 
2014). The environmental factors implicated in myopia include near work, outdoor 
activities, and nutrition. For instance, near work, such as close reading distance and 
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continuous reading, increases the odds of having myopia (Ip et al., 2008). Time spent 
outdoors is associated with a decreased risk of myopia (Rose et al., 2008; Sherwin et 
al., 2012; Guo et al., 2013), due to the protective effects of bright light. Diet and 
nutrition are also environmental determinants of myopia and myopic progression. A 
recent study by Lim et al. (2010) finds that higher saturated fat and cholesterol are 
correlated with higher risk of myopia. Among these risk factors of myopia, genetic 
factors do not explain the rising prevalence of myopia in China from 1990s, as gene 
pools just do not change in two generations. The increased computer use may lead to 
increased myopia. However, a number of studies have examined the effect of 
computer use on myopia and found no significant correlation (Mutti and Zadnik, 1996; 
Rose et al., 2008). There is clear evidence that a high and increasing prevalence of 
myopia in East Asia is driven by increasing educational pressures and urbanization 
(Morgen et al., 2012).  
   In this paper, we exploit the quasi-natural experiment generated by One-Child 
Policy in China to identify the causal effect of being an only-child on the odds of 
having myopia. We find that being an only-child increases the incidence of myopia by 
approximately 9.1 percentage points and the positive only-child effect is not due to 
the birth order effect. As shown by the Population Census data in China, the share of 
only-children among junior high school students increased from 5% in 1990 to 42.7% 
in 2005. This implies that the growing share of only-children leads to a 3.43 
percentage points increase in the incidence of myopia during this period, which 
explains approximately 15% of the total increase in the prevalence of myopia in 
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China.  
 We further examine the potential mechanisms through which being an only-child 
affects myopia. We find that only-children, as the only hope in a household, receive 
higher expectations from parents in terms of academic performance and future 
educational attainment, which contribute to the increased myopia. The findings are 
consistent with the evidence found in the literature, that is, only-children receive more 
attention from parents as well as higher expectations and pressure to succeed in life 
(Roberts and Blanton, 2001). We also find that the school quality of only-children is 
significantly higher than that of non-only-children. In order to better understand the 
mechanisms, we further investigate the impact of being an only-child on time 
allocation of students. However, we find no significant difference in time allocation 
between only-children and non-only-children. Finally, we find that the expectations of 
parents, school quality and time spent on school assigned homework significantly 
contribute to the myopia. After controlling for parental expectations, school quality 
and time allocation, the impact of being an only-child on myopia become 
insignificant. 
    The contributions of this paper are two-folded. Firstly, the prevalence of myopia 
has markedly increased within the past two decades in China. This is the first study 
which relates the rising prevalence of myopia and the growing number of 
only-children induced by One-Child Policy. Secondly, this paper exploits the 
quasi-natural experiment generated by the One-Child Policy in China to identify the 
causal effect of being an only-child on the odds of having myopia. 
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    The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the 
identification strategy. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 4 
reports the empirical results and discusses potential channels through which being an 
only-child affects the odds of having myopia. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
To examine the impact of single child on myopia, we estimate the following 
regression: 
𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑖 + 𝐷𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖            (1) 
where 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎𝑖 is a dummy variable which equals one if the student is short-sighted. 
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖  is an indicator for being an only-child, and the coefficient of interest would 
be 𝛽1. 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of student characteristics, including gender, age, age squared, 
ethnicity, grade, hukou type, local resident dummy, and a dummy indicating whether 
the student had any serious disease before primary school. 𝐻𝑖 refers to parental and 
household characteristics, including parental educational level, party membership, 
occupation type, household economic condition, whether the household receives 
Dibao subsidy, the presence of sick or disabled household members who need 
long-term care, the access to tap water and the use of improved sanitation facilities.
1
 
For the occupation type, we use a dummy variable indicating whether parents have 
professional occupations. More specifically, we define professional occupation as 
government official, general and senior manager in enterprises, senior professional 
                                                             
1 The Dibao program is also called the Minimum Living Standard Guarantee scheme in China.  
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(including doctor, professor, lawyer, engineer, and etc.), and define non-professional 
occupation as skilled worker (including craftsman, driver, and etc.), un-skilled worker, 
service worker, self-employed, farmer and unemployed. Household economic 
condition, which measures household income, comes from responses to the following 
survey question: “How’s your family’s current economic condition?”. Responses were 
on a five-point scale, ranging from very poor to very rich. In Equation (1), we control 
for dummies of economic condition. To control for observable and unobservable 
characteristics of a county/district, we also include county/district dummies 𝐷𝑐 in the 
regression. 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. 
If being a single child is exogenous, the effect of single child can be estimated 
consistently by ordinary least squares (OLS). However, the number of children in a 
household is determined by parents. Parents who value quality (e.g., education and 
health) may prefer an only-child. Moreover, parental preference for child quality 
might affect children’s likelihood of being myopic. On the one hand, parents who 
value education may impose higher educational pressures on their only-children. Due 
to the higher educational pressure induced by parental preference, these only-children 
tend to work hard and have intensive near work, such as close reading distance and 
continuous reading, which increases the odds of having myopia (Ip et al., 2008). Thus, 
only-child and myopia may both be the consequences of parental preference for child 
quality. On the other hand, parents who value quality may also concern over health of 
their children. Thus, they tend to provide sufficient nutrition and suitable studying 
environment to their children, which may reduce the odds of having myopia. Parental 
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preference is the unobserved variable, which is associated with both only-child 
indicator and myopia. Consequently, OLS estimator may suffer from the omitted 
variable bias. In other words, the coefficient on 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖 in Equation (1) would pick 
up not only the effect of being a single child but also the effect of any omitted family 
background variables, for example, parental preference for child quality. 
In this paper, we use the exogenous imposition of the One-Child Policy to 
identify the causal impact of being an only-child, net of family background effects. 
The One-Child Policy was initiated in 1980. At the early stage of the implementation 
of the One-Child Policy, the second birth was strictly forbidden. Because of the 
gendercide caused by the strict One-Child Policy, in 1984 the central government 
relaxed the strict One-Child Policy and allowed rural couples to have a second child if 
the first child was a girl, which is referred to as 1.5 child policy.
2
 In China, most 
parents have a very strong desire to have at least one son. As rural couples can have a 
second birth if the first birth was a daughter, they do not use sex-selective abortion for 
their first pregnancies but tend to use sex-selective abortion to ensure a boy in the 
second pregnancy. Despite the overall imbalanced sex ratio in China, the sex ratio of 
the first birth is quite normal and the gender of the first child could be viewed as 
exogenous (Ebenstein 2010, 2011; Chen et al., 2013). Table 1 reports the sex ratio at 
birth in China by birth order during 1995-2000 based on the 0.1% sample of the 2000 
Population Census data. The sex ratio of the first born child is 106.44 and 105.55 in 
                                                             
2 The policy imposes a 2- or 3-child policy limit for provinces in remote areas. The policy also grants exclusions 
to various groups, including Chinese ethnic minorities and those employed in dangerous occupations (Ebenstein, 
2010). See Wang et al. (2017) for a review of the historical evolution of China’s family planning policies. However, 
the validity of our identification strategy does not rely on whether One-Child Policies in rural China are universal 
or not. 
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urban and rural areas, respectively, which is around the natural sex ratio across world 
populations. The results in Table 1 indicate that parents may not engage in sex 
selection for their first birth, and the gender of the firs-born child tends to be 
exogenous to the myopia rates. Moreover, the 1.5 child policy in rural China implies 
that families tend to have a second child if the first-born child is a daughter. Thus, the 
gender of the first-born child can be used as an instrumental variable (IV) for single 
child. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
    Additionally, the enforcement of the one-child policy varies across regions and 
across years. We can measure the strength of the enforcement of the one-child policy 
by using the average monetary penalty rate for one unauthorized birth in the 
provincial-level panel from 1980-2000 from Ebenstein (2010).
3
 The fine rates are 
formulated in years of household income (Ebenstein, 2010; Huang et al., 2016; Huang 
and Zhou, 2015). Figure A.1 plots the fertility penalty from 1980 to 2000 in each 
province, suggesting that fine rates in different provinces follow different patterns, 
both in terms of timing and magnitude. The geographical and temporal variances of 
fine rates help us identify the effects of the One-Child Policy in the empirical analysis. 
Because a pregnancy usually lasts for 9 months, parents’ decision to have a child, if 
any, should be made close to a year in advance. We therefore match the CEPS data 
with the policy fine (at provincial level) one year before the birth year of students. 
The fine rates one year before the birth year should be exogenous to the myopia rate. 
                                                             
3 Though the monetary penalty is one aspect of the policy, it can capture key elements of the variation in the 
strictness of the policy (Gu et al., 2007). 
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   The gender of the first-born child and lagged fine rates in the corresponding 
province and year can act as instruments for single child indicator, which can be 
illustrated as the following regression: 
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ + 𝛾2𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ + 𝛾3𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾4𝐻𝑖 + 𝐷𝑐 + 𝜂𝑖      (2) 
 
3. DATA 
We use data from the China Education Panel Survey (CEPS) conducted by National 
Survey Research Center (NSRC) at Renmin University of China.
4
 The CEPS is a 
national, representative, longitudinal survey of junior high school students in China. 
The baseline survey was conducted in the 2013-2014 school year starting with two 
cohorts - the 7th and 9th graders. The CEPS applies a stratified, multistage sampling 
design with probability proportional to size (PPS), randomly selecting a school-based, 
nationally representative sample of approximately 20,000 students in 438 classrooms 
of 112 schools in 28 county-level units in mainland China. The CEPS administers 5 
different questionnaires to (1) the sample students, (2) their parents, (3) their 
homeroom teachers, (4) their main subject teachers, and (5) their school 
administrators. 
3.1 Definition of myopia 
The definition of myopia comes from students’ responses to the following survey 
question “Are you nearsighted?”. The answers to this question include: (1) Yes, I 
know the degree of myopia; (2) Yes, but I do not know the degree of myopia; (3) No. 
                                                             
4
 Detailed information about the CEPS survey is available at the CEPS website 
http://chinaeps.org/index.php?r=index/index&hl=en. 
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If the answer to this equation is (1), then the student is required to report the degree of 
myopia in both eyes. We define that a student is nearsighted if his/her answer to this 
question is “Yes” no matter whether he/she knows the degree of myopia or not. So the 
myopia status in this paper is self-reported.
5
 
    Due to the nature of the data set, we cannot observe the true value 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎𝑖
∗, but 
an observable measure 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎𝑖, which is self-reported by students. We define 
𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎𝑖 −  𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎𝑖
∗ = 𝑒                      (3) 
where 𝑒 is the measurement error, partly depending on whether a student has had an 
eye examination recently. Consequently, the equation that we can estimate is, 
𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑖 + 𝐷𝑐 + 𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖         (4) 
If only-children tend to have eye examinations and, thus, are more likely to 
report having myopia, measurement error bias may arise. Nevertheless, if whether a 
student has had an eye examination recently is not significantly associated with the 
gender of the first-born child and fine rates, which are instrumental variables for 
single child indicator, the estimates using IV approach are consistent. The results in 
Table A.1 confirm that the indicator whether a student has had an eye examination 
recently is not significantly associated with the gender of the first-born child and fines 
rates.  
3.2 Myopia in China 
                                                             
5
 As most students in China have routine physical examination every year, including eye examination, normally 
students know their myopia status. More specifically, the CEPS shows that approximately 80% of students have 
eye examinations. 
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Table 2 shows the prevalence of myopia in junior high school students in China based 
on the CEPS survey. 59% of the junior high school students are short-sighted; 
however, only approximately 50% of myopic students know their degree of myopia.
6
 
The myopia rates are increasing with the years of schooling, from 53% for the 7th 
graders to 66% for the 9th graders. Interestingly, the incidence of myopia is higher for 
only-children, that is, 66% for only-children, compared to 54% for children with one 
or more siblings. Additionally, students in urban areas and girls are more likely to be 
short-sighted. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
3.3 Summary statistics 
The characteristics of only-children and children with one or more siblings 
(non-only-children) are reported in Table 3. As expected, only-children are more 
likely to come from households with a first born boy. Only-children tend to be boy, 
younger, and to have urban hukou. Parents of only-children tend to be more educated, 
to be party members, to have professional occupations and to be richer. We also find 
that only-children and non-only-children have different time use patterns. 
Only-children tend to sleep less, and spend significantly more time on homework 
assigned either by teachers or parents, extracurricular classes, but less time on 
watching TV. Specifically, non-only-children spend approximately 2.5 hours per day 
on homework, including those assigned both by parents and teachers, while 
only-children spend 3 hours per day on homework, both of which are substantially 
                                                             
6 The percentage of myopic students who know their degree of myopia is comparable to the percentage of myopic 
students who wear glasses found in He et al. (2007). 
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higher than the maximum hours, i.e., 1.5 hours, set by the Ministry of Education in 
China in 2008. Parents have significantly higher long-term expectation on 
only-children in terms of future educational attainment. The school quality of 
only-children is significantly higher than that of non-only-children.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Baseline Results 
Table 4 presents the effect of single child on myopia applying both OLS and IV 
estimation strategy. The results of OLS estimation suggest that being an only-child 
has a significantly positive effect on the odds of having myopia. Specifically, 
compared to students who have one or more siblings, being an only-child increases 
the incidence of myopia by 2.6 percentage points. As previously discussed, OLS 
estimate may be biased because only-child is largely a choice of parents. Parents who 
value quality may prefer an only-child. Thus, the coefficient of single child may also 
pick up the effect of omitted family background variables. 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
   In order to address the potential endogeneity issue, we apply the gender of the 
first-born child and one-year lagged provincial fine rates as instrumental variables for 
the only-child indicator. As expected, if the first-born child is a boy, the incidence of 
being an only-child increases by 22 percentage points; if provincial fine rates, 
formulated in years of household income, increases by 1, the probability of being an 
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only-child increases by 2 percentage points. The IV estimates in column (3) show that 
being an only-child increases the incidence of myopia by 9.1 percentage points, which 
is substantially larger in magnitude than the OLS estimate which is shown in column 
(4) of Table 4. As discussed in Section 2, the OLS estimator can be biased downwards 
or upwards. The results in column (4) suggest that the downward bias tends to 
dominate the upward bias. Finally，various tests, such as under-identification test, 
weak identification test and over-identification test, all suggest that these two IVs are 
valid. 
   For both OLS and IV results, the coefficients of other control variables are 
consistent and as expected. The significantly negative coefficient of boy dummy 
implies that girls are more likely to be myopic than boys, which is consistent with the 
existing findings in the literature (for example, Fan et al., 2004; Rudnicka et al., 2016, 
among others). One possible explanation would be that girls tend to spend more time 
on homework, reading and other near-work activities, whereas boys spend more time 
on outdoor activities (Lu et al., 2009). The subsequent increase in near-work 
predisposes girls to myopia development. Compared to the 7th graders, the 9th 
graders are approximately 13 percentage points more likely to have myopia problems. 
Interestingly, after controlling for the grade dummy, age has no significant effect on 
the incidence of myopia, implying that study load other than age matters for being 
myopic.  
Family backgrounds also play roles in shaping children’s myopia status. We 
consistently find that fathers with professional occupations significantly increase the 
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incidence of myopia of their children. Nevertheless, the educational level of parents 
does not have significant effects on the likelihood of myopia. Students from 
households which receive Dibao subsidy are less likely to be myopic. Moreover, after 
controlling for Dibao subsidy dummy, family economic status does not significantly 
influence the incidence of myopia. 
    The baseline results suggest that the vision impact of One-Child Policy is 
remarkable: being an only-child increases the incidence of myopia by 9.1 percentage 
points. A number of studies find that the undesirable consequences of One-Child 
Policy on other health outcomes are also sizeable. For example, Zhang et al. (2016) 
find that being an only-child increases the probability of being overweight by 9 
percentage points. Park and Wu (2016) show that being an only child increases one’s 
depression by 0.59 standard deviations (SD) and decreases one’s happiness by 0.56 
SD. 
4.2 The Degree of Myopia 
In Section 4.1, we apply an indicator, i.e., myopia status, to measure nearsightedness. 
However, in the survey, students who are nearsighted and know their degree of 
myopia are required to report the degree of myopia in both eyes.
7
 In this section, we 
apply the information on the degree of nearsightedness to investigate whether being 
an only-child affects the level of myopia. 
                                                             
7 In the sample, approximately 50% of students who are nearsighted do not know the exact degree of myopia. 
Having information on the degree of myopia tend to be related with only-child status, as only-children who are 
nearsighted, are more likely to wear glasses and thus have their eyeglasses prescriptions. This is the major concern 
of self-reported degree of myopia. Nevertheless, myopia status, whose measurement error is less likely to be 
correlated with only-child status, is less problematic. Thus, our main results rely on the self-reported myopia 
status. 
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    To this end, we follow Cline et al. (1997) and classify myopia by diopter or 
degree as follows: 1 = normal or emmetropic (0); 2 = mild nearsightedness (-0.25 to 
-3.00 diopters); 3 = moderate nearsightedness (-3.00 to -6.00 diopters); 4 = severe 
nearsightedness (-6.00 diopters or higher).
8
 We analyze the effect of being an 
only-child on the degree of myopia with an IV-ordered probit model. The marginal 
effects from the IV-ordered probit model are reported in Table 5, suggesting that 
only-child tends to have worse vision in both left and right eyes. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.3 Robustness Checks 
The significant and positive effect of only-children on the odds of myopia found in 
Section 4.1 may be simply due to the birth order effect. An only-child is the first-born 
child in a household. A number of studies show that first-born children are more likely 
to be myopic than their younger siblings, because first-born children receive more 
attention from their parents in terms of their education (Morgan and Cotch, 2013; 
Guggenheim and Williams, 2015). We test the robustness of our results by controlling 
for birth order in Equation (1).  
   In column (1) of Table 6, we first control for the number of siblings in the 
regression and find that it reduces the incidence of myopia, though statistically 
insignificant. In column (2), to capture the non-linear effects of the number of siblings, 
we use dummies of the number of siblings rather than a continuous variable. 
Nevertheless, as we do not have enough instruments for the dummies, we can only 
                                                             
8 Students who did not report their degree of myopia are considered to be emmetropia.  
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apply OLS estimation here. The coefficients of dummies show that the negative effect 
of the number of siblings becomes greater as the number increases. In column (3), we 
only control for the birth order of students and find a negative effect of birth order on 
the incidence of myopia, though statistically insignificant.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
In order to disentangle the effect of the number of siblings and birth order effect, 
in column (4) of Table 6 we control for both the number of siblings and dummies for 
birth order. Given the number of siblings in a household, which is instrumented with 
the gender of the first-born child and one-year lagged provincial fine rates, the birth 
order of a child is exogenous. We find a significantly negative effect of the number of 
siblings on the incidence of myopia after controlling for the birth order effect. This 
implies that, given the same birth order, the presence of an extra sibling reduces the 
incidence of myopia. For example, the coefficient of the number of siblings reflects 
the difference in the odds of myopia between first-born child without siblings (i.e., 
only-child) and first-born child with siblings (i.e., non-only-child). Therefore, we 
confirm that the positive one-child effect is not due to birth order effect. Additionally, 
the coefficients of dummies for birth order indicate that middle child has the highest 
incidence of myopia. 
4.4 Heterogeneous Effects 
To better understand the consequence of being an only-child on myopia, we further 
investigate whether the effect of being an only-child on the incidence of myopia 
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differs across sub-groups in our data. To this end, we divide the sample by gender, 
grade, and household economic condition. The results are reported in Table 7. Note 
that the statistical test of differences in coefficients across groups reveals that there is 
no significant heterogeneity in the only-child impacts. Thus, the results in Table 7 
should be interpreted with caution. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
    Because of son preference in China, the only-child effects may be larger for boys. 
However, the estimates for girls and boys in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 indicate 
no significant difference in one-child effects across gender.  
    The impact of single child may be greater for the 9th graders due to the longer 
exposure to higher educational pressure. We report the results for the 7th graders and 
9th graders separately in columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 and find that one-child effect 
is significant and stronger only for the 7th graders whereas there is no significant 
effect for the 9th graders. Although only-children do not have a significantly higher 
incidence of myopia in the 9th grade, they are probably at higher risk of developing 
higher degree of myopia as only-children became myopic at an earlier age. Table A.2 
suggests that being an only-child is significantly associated with greater risk of having 
severe nearsightedness (-6.00 diopters or higher) for the 9th graders. However, the 
relationship is insignificant for the 7th graders. 
    Parents with different socio-economic status may place different expectations on 
their children. For example, parents in poor families may emphasize the role of 
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education as a mean of alleviating poverty and thus have higher expectation on 
only-children. We next examine whether one-child impacts on myopia are stronger for 
students from poor families. As shown in the last column of Table 7, only-children 
have higher incidence of myopia in poor families. However, the impact of being an 
only-child on the incidence of myopia is insignificant for students from families 
whose economic conditions are medium or above (see column (5) in Table 7). 
4.5 Channels 
The exogenous decline in fertility induced by the One-Child Policy in China forces 
parents to place “all their eggs in one basket” with only-children. Only-children, who 
are the only hope in a household, receive more attention and resources from their 
parents. Accordingly, they also receive higher expectations and pressures from parents 
to succeed in life. Thus, only-children tend to work hard and are more likely to be 
myopic. In order to test the above mechanisms, we consider two dimensions of 
expectations, i.e., parents’ short-term expectations on children’s relative ranking of 
test scores in the class and parents’ long-term expectations on children’s future 
educational attainment. For the short-term expectation, students are asked whether 
their parents have specific requirements on their academic performance measured by 
their relative ranking of test scores. With regard to the long-term expectation, students 
are asked which educational attainment their parents hope that they will achieve in the 
future, for example, high school, college, or master. Note that both the short-term and 
long-term expectations of parents are reported by students, as it is the perceived 
parental expectation that influences the behavior of students. 
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   In order to deal with the endogeneity issue, we apply IV-ordered probit model for 
two categorical expectation measures. Only-child indicator is instrumented with the 
gender of the first-born child and provincial fine rates. The first two columns in Table 
8 present the impacts of single child on both parents’ short- and long-term 
expectations. We find that parents hold significantly higher expectations if they have 
an only-child. This suggests that the effects of single child on myopia could go 
through the channel by raising expectations of parents having an only-child. In 
addition, we find that not only children’s characteristics, but also parents’ features 
matter for parental expectations.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
   Parents who place higher expectations on their only-children may also choose 
higher school quality for their children. The last column in Table 8 presents the impact 
of single child on the choice of school quality. School quality is measured by the 
relative ranking of junior high schools in a county/district. As above, we apply an 
IV-ordered probit model here. We find that parents of single child tend to choose high 
quality schools. Since school quality is determined by performance-based evaluation, 
the only-child who is more likely to be in high quality schools will bear heavy study 
load and exert more study effort, thus in turn increases the likelihood of having 
myopia problems. Additionally, we also find that the characteristics of students, 
parents and family economic conditions affect the choices of schools. Better educated 
parents and parents with professional occupations tend to choose higher school quality 
for their children. 
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As discussed above, the higher incidence of myopia for only-children may go 
through higher expectations from parents by raising students’ study effort. Therefore, 
we further test whether the only-child has different time allocation from 
non-only-child. We also apply both the gender of the first born child and fine rates as 
IVs for single child indicator to address the endogeneity issue. Table 9 presents the 
impact of the only-child on time allocation in both weekdays and weekends. We find 
no significant difference in time allocation between only-children and 
non-only-children both in weekdays and weekends.
9
 The insignificant impacts of 
single child on time allocation are probably due to the substantial measurement errors 
in time use data reported by students. In the time use survey of CEPS, students were 
asked to recall how they spent their time on various activities in the last week. It 
requires respondents to perform two difficult tasks: to recall their activities in the last 
week and to carry out an appropriate form of averaging. The recall error and the 
inappropriate form of averaging might lead to substantial measurement error.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
Finally, we test whether parental expectations, choices of schools and students’ 
time allocation contribute to the increased myopia. To this end, we control for parental 
expectations, choices of schools and students’ time allocation in the myopia 
regression in Table 10. We find that the effect of only-child on myopia is captured by 
newly added controls. Higher parental expectations and school quality are 
significantly associated with higher incidence of myopia. More school assigned 
                                                             
9
 One exception is that only-children tend to spend significantly less time on doing homework assigned by parents 
in weekends.  
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homework and internet surfing increase the likelihood of having myopia problems. 
This further supports our argued mechanism that the one-child policy effect on 
myopia is mainly through parental expectations and students’ study effort.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
The traditional quantity-quality trade-off model implies that only-children receive 
more resources and thus have higher educational attainment and health. In this paper, 
we show that only-children also receive higher expectations and pressures from 
parents to succeed in life, which induces a high incidence of myopia. This paper 
relates the growing number of only-children induced by One-Child Policy and the 
rising prevalence of myopia, providing new insights into an important health 
consequence of One-Child Policy in China. We exploit the quasi-natural experiment 
generated by One-Child Policy in China to identify the causal effect of being an 
only-child on the odds of myopia. We find that being an only-child increases the 
incidence of myopia by approximately 9 percentage points.  
 We further examine the potential mechanisms through which being an only-child 
affects the incidence of myopia. We find that only-children, as the only hope in a 
household, receive higher expectations from parents in terms of academic 
performance and future educational attainment, which contribute to the increased 
myopia. We also find significantly higher school quality of only-children, as one of 
the consequences of higher parental expectation. However, only-children do not have 
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significantly different time allocation to various activities. Moreover, we find that the 
expectations of parents, school quality and time spent on teacher assigned homework 
significantly contribute to the myopia. 
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FIGURE 1  The prevalence of myopia of junior high school students in China: 
1995-2010 
Source: The National Survey on the Constitution and Health of Chinese Students 1995, 2000, 2005 and 
2010. 
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TABLE 1  Sex ratio at birth in China by birth order: 1995-2000 
Birth order Urban Rural All 
First child 106.44 105.55 105.85 
Second child 134.19 149.44 148.32 
Third child 179.56 163.64 163.99 
Average of all birth orders 110.39 125.23 122.07 
Notes: based on 2000 Population Census in China. 
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TABLE 2  The prevalence of myopia among junior high school students in China 
 Mean S.D. Percentage of 
myopic students 
who know the 
degree 
All 0.59 0.49 50.13% 
# of siblings    
Only-child 0.66 0.47 54.49% 
Non only-child 0.54 0.50 46.06% 
Hukou type    
Urban 0.65 0.48 54.56% 
Rural 0.55 0.50 45.81% 
Gender    
Girl 0.64 0.48 49.43% 
Boy 0.54 0.50 50.92% 
Grade    
7
th
 grade 0.53 0.50 48.08% 
9
th
 grade 0.66     0.47 51.97% 
Notes: based on China Education Panel Survey (CEPS) 2013-2014. 
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TABLE 3  Summary Statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Non-only-child Only-child Diff 
Variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D.  
Student characteristics      
Short-sighted 0.540 0.498 0.656 0.475 0.116*** 
First birth = boy 0.360 0.480 0.557 0.497 0.198*** 
Boy 0.483 0.500 0.557 0.497 0.074*** 
Age 14.64 1.281 14.37 1.166 -0.268*** 
Han ethnicity 0.886 0.318 0.948 0.223 0.062*** 
Local resident 0.792 0.406 0.858 0.349 0.066*** 
Rural hukou 0.712 0.453 0.335 0.472 -0.378*** 
Any serious disease before primary school 0.110 0.313 0.0678 0.251 -0.042*** 
Parental and household characteristics      
Education of father 9.302 2.599 11.59 3.235 2.293*** 
Education of mother 8.281 3.165 11.17 3.308 2.885*** 
Party member 0.0802 0.272 0.178 0.383 0.098*** 
Professional occupation (father) 0.103 0.305 0.294 0.455 0.190*** 
Professional occupation (mother) 0.0542 0.226 0.243 0.429 0.189*** 
Household economic condition 2.722 0.645 2.937 0.508 0 .215*** 
Sick/disabled household members 0.144 0.351 0.0996 0.299 -0.044*** 
Tap water 0.818 0.386 0.938 0.241 0.120*** 
Improved sanitation facilities 0.790 0.407 0.915 0.279 0.125*** 
Time allocation of students      
Sleeping hours 8.076 1.018 7.863 1.026 -0.213*** 
Hours spent on homework assigned by teachers 2.011 1.360 2.349 1.251 0 .338*** 
Hours spend on homework assigned by parents 0.492 0.831 0.628 0.909 0.137*** 
Hours spent on extra class 0.142 0.462 0.241 0.597 0.099*** 
Hours spent on sports 0.659 0.719 0.678 0.719 0.020* 
Hours spent on watching TV 0.725 0.941 0.572 0.835 -0.154*** 
Hours spent on surfing the internet 0.390 0.711 0.375 0.682 -0.016 
Expectations and school quality      
Expectation: academic performance 2.813 0.932 2.834 0.885 0.020 
Expectation: educational attainment 3.848 0.987 4.092 0.849 0.244*** 
School quality 3.820 0.866 4.112 0.759 0.292*** 
Notes: based on China Education Panel Survey (CEPS) 2013-2014. Column (5) shows the t-Test of 
difference between only-children and non-only-children. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 4  Impact of only child on myopia status 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Variables 
OLS 1st stage: 
Only child 
2nd stage: 
Myopia 
OLS: same 
sample 
Instrumental variable     
First birth = boy  0.22***   
  (0.0099)   
Fine in years of income  0.020**   
  (0.0076)   
Only-child 0.026***  0.091* 0.017* 
 (0.0094)  (0.055) (0.010) 
Boy -0.098*** -0.063*** -0.10*** -0.094*** 
 (0.0075) (0.0096) (0.0099) (0.0081) 
Age -0.0086 -0.12* -0.043 -0.049 
 (0.069) (0.065) (0.083) (0.083) 
Age squared 0.010 0.34 0.14 0.15 
 (0.23) (0.22) (0.28) (0.28) 
Han ethnicity 0.013 0.011 0.0071 0.0078 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) 
9th grade dummy 0.14*** 0.078*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) 
Rural hukou -0.033*** -0.15*** -0.018 -0.030*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0088) (0.013) (0.010) 
Local resident 0.0083 0.16*** 0.0053 0.017 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) 
Any serious disease before primary school -0.0066 -0.00033 -0.0069 -0.0071 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) 
Education of father 0.0016 0.0091*** 0.00047 0.0011 
 (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0019) 
Education of mother 0.0029* 0.015*** 0.0024 0.0036** 
 (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0017) 
Party member 0.018 0.060*** 0.026** 0.030** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 
Professional occupation (father) 0.032*** 0.015 0.033*** 0.034*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Professional occupation (mother) 0.0057 0.069*** -0.0060 -0.00080 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) 
Economic condition: poor 0.00080 0.019 -0.0032 -0.0014 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) 
Economic condition: average 0.0074 0.042** 0.00047 0.0038 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) 
Economic condition: rich -0.021 -0.015 -0.020 -0.022 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) 
Economic condition: very rich -0.14* -0.051 -0.12 -0.13 
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 (0.081) (0.071) (0.087) (0.087) 
Dibao subsidy -0.025* 0.00035 -0.025* -0.025* 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) 
Sick/disabled household members 0.024** -0.00090 0.022* 0.022* 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) 
Tap water 0.017 0.021* 0.021 0.023 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) 
Improved sanitation facilities 0.031*** 0.0038 0.028** 0.028** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 
Constant 0.64 1.14** 0.84 0.91 
 (0.51) (0.48) (0.62) (0.62) 
County/district fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,226 13,938 13,938 13,938 
R-squared 0.086 0.398 0.080 0.084 
Notes: The sample used in columns (3) and (4) are the same. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 5  Impact of only child on the degree of myopia 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Variables 
Normal Mild 
nearsighted 
ness 
Moderate 
nearsightedness 
Severe 
nearsightedness 
Panel A: Left eye     
Only-child -0.036* 0.015* 0.018* 0.0029* 
 (0.019) (0.008) (0.009) (0.0015) 
     
County/district fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 14,032 14,032 14,032 14,032 
Panel B: Right eye     
Only-child -0.039** 0.015** 0.020** 0.0035** 
 (0.018) (0.0072) (0.0096) (0.0017) 
County/district fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 14,032 14,032 14,032 14,032 
Notes: The coefficients are the marginal effects from IV-ordered probit models. Only-child indicator 
is instrumented with the gender of the first birth and provincial fine rates. All regressions include 
both individual and household characteristics (coefficient estimates not reported). Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 6  Robustness checks of birth order effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables IV Nonlinearity: OLS IV IV 
No. of siblings -0.056   -0.14* 
 (0.035)   (0.072) 
# of siblings = 1  -0.021**   
  (0.0096)   
# of siblings = 2  -0.047***   
  (0.015)   
# of siblings = 3  -0.090***   
  (0.029)   
# of siblings = 4  -0.017   
  (0.052)   
# of siblings = 5  0.0034   
  (0.071)   
Birth order   -0.023  
   (0.018)  
Birth order = middle child    0.19* 
    (0.11) 
Birth order = last-born    0.077* 
    (0.040) 
Constant 0.94 0.62 0.95 0.93 
 (0.62) (0.52) (0.62) (0.63) 
County/district fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,938 15,993 13,938 13,938 
R-squared 0.082 0.086 0.083 0.069 
Notes: The reference group of the number of siblings in column (2) is single child. The reference 
group of birth order in column (4) is the first-born. The number of siblings in columns (1) and (4) 
is instrumented with the gender of the first birth and provincial fine rate. The birth order in column 
(3) is also instrumented with the gender of the first birth and provincial fine rates. All regressions 
include both individual and household characteristics (coefficient estimates not reported). Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 7  Heterogeneous impacts of only child on myopia 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Variables 
Girl Boy 7th graders 9th graders High income 
households 
Low income 
households 
       
Only-child 0.032 0.039 0.14* 0.012 0.056 0.22* 
 (0.085) (0.033) (0.079) (0.078) (0.060) (0.13) 
Constant -0.48 1.81** 1.58 2.62 0.66 1.25 
 (0.91) (0.85) (1.66) (1.90) (0.72) (1.33) 
       
Observations 6,871 7,067 7,002 6,936 11,241 2,697 
R-squared 0.069 0.090 0.068 0.076 0.079 0.069 
County/district fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value 0.478 0.152 0.166 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using instrumental variables and include both individual and household characteristics (coefficient estimates not reported). Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 8  Impacts of only-child on expectations of parents and school quality 
 (1) (8) (16) 
 
Variables 
Expectation: 
score 
Expectation: 
degree 
School 
quality 
Only-child 0.11** 0.11* 0.16*** 
 (0.054) (0.062) (0.056) 
Boy -0.16*** -0.16*** 0.011 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
Age -0.49*** -0.83*** -0.42** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Age squared 1.31** 2.45*** 1.14** 
 (0.57) (0.56) (0.58) 
Han ethnicity 0.041 0.071 0.11** 
 (0.044) (0.047) (0.047) 
9th grade dummy -0.018 -0.024 0.21*** 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) 
Rural hukou 0.093*** -0.013 -0.24*** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) 
Local resident -0.097*** -0.087*** 0.030 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) 
Any serious disease before primary school -0.027 -0.021 -0.053* 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) 
Education of father 0.030*** 0.054*** 0.049*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0045) 
Education of mother 0.0017 0.023*** 0.033*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0041) 
Party member -0.047* -0.00091 0.055* 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) 
Professional occupation (father) 0.014 0.11*** 0.10*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.030) 
Professional occupation (mother) 0.015 0.13*** 0.19*** 
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.035) 
Economic condition: poor 0.043 0.045 0.10** 
 (0.053) (0.057) (0.048) 
Economic condition: average 0.017 0.029 0.25*** 
 (0.052) (0.056) (0.047) 
Economic condition: rich 0.023 0.099 0.37*** 
 (0.064) (0.067) (0.064) 
Economic condition: very rich -0.13 0.12 0.13 
 (0.19) (0.22) (0.18) 
Dibao subsidy -0.10*** -0.14*** -0.11*** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
Sick/disabled household members 0.038 0.036 -0.014 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) 
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Tap water -0.029 -0.0037 0.21*** 
 (0.030) (0.033) (0.031) 
Improved sanitation facilities 0.029 0.081*** 0.077*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) 
County/district fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,327 16,323 16,319 
Log pseudolikelihood -26373.64 -24664.54 -21713.65 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using instrumental variables. Only-child indicator is 
instrumented with the gender of the first birth and provincial fine rates. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 9  Impact of only-child on time allocation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Variables 
Sleep Homework
-teachers 
Homework
-parents 
TV hour Internet Extra-class Sports 
Panel A: Weekdays        
Only-child -0.14 -0.086 -0.14 0.095 -0.063 -0.014 0.14 
 (0.11) (0.16) (0.097) (0.11) (0.093) (0.056) (0.091) 
Constant 10.4*** 1.57 -0.21 0.80 -1.93** -1.54** 2.21** 
 (1.25) (1.76) (1.13) (1.29) (0.92) (0.63) (1.00) 
Observations 12,708 12,428 12,538 12,597 12,569 12,567 12,572 
R-squared 0.218 0.163 0.065 0.065 0.046 0.087 0.020 
Panel B: Weekends        
Only-child  -0.15 -0.21* 0.11 -0.14 -0.028 0.17 
  (0.20) (0.12) (0.17) (0.16) (0.11) (0.12) 
Constant  0.51 1.48 2.02 -0.54 -2.97** 3.40*** 
  (2.14) (1.36) (1.73) (1.59) (1.33) (1.22) 
Observations  11,593 11,764 11,673 11,711 11,726 11,591 
R-squared  0.088 0.070 0.044 0.080 0.219 0.040 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using instrumental variables and include both individual and 
household characteristics (coefficient estimates not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 10  Only-child, expectation of parents, time allocation and myopia 
 (1) 
Variables Myopia 
  
Only-child 0.089 
 (0.069) 
Boy -0.098*** 
 (0.012) 
Age -0.028 
 (0.098) 
Age squared 0.091 
 (0.33) 
Han ethnicity 0.0098 
 (0.025) 
9th grade dummy 0.12*** 
 (0.019) 
Rural hukou -0.017 
 (0.016) 
Local resident 0.0097 
 (0.017) 
Any serious disease before primary school 0.00099 
 (0.018) 
Education of father 0.00021 
 (0.0023) 
Education of mother 0.0025 
 (0.0023) 
Party member 0.022 
 (0.015) 
Professional occupation (father) 0.028** 
 (0.014) 
Professional occupation (mother) -0.016 
 (0.017) 
Economic condition: poor -0.0053 
 (0.031) 
Economic condition: average -0.012 
 (0.030) 
Economic condition: rich -0.031 
 (0.036) 
Economic condition: very rich -0.11 
 (0.10) 
Dibao subsidy -0.023 
 (0.018) 
Sick/disabled household members 0.022 
 (0.015) 
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Tap water 0.021 
 (0.018) 
Improved sanitation facilities 0.027* 
 (0.015) 
Expectation: academic performance 0.019*** 
 (0.0057) 
Expectation: educational attainment 0.016*** 
 (0.0062) 
School quality 0.014* 
 (0.0073) 
Sleeping hours -0.0046 
 (0.0053) 
Hours spent on homework assigned by teachers 0.0081** 
 (0.0041) 
Hours spend on homework assigned by parents -0.00043 
 (0.0054) 
Hours spent on surfing the internet 0.012* 
 (0.0072) 
Hours spent on sports -0.0090 
 (0.0068) 
Constant 0.56 
 (0.74) 
County/district fixed effect Yes 
Observations 10,201 
R-squared 0.081 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix A. Supplementary Figures and Tables 
 
FIGURE A.1  One-child policy regulatory fine rates in 1980–2000, by province.  
Source: Ebenstein (2010). 
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TABLE A.1  Having an eye examination 
 (1) (2) 
 
Variables 
Having an eye 
examination 
Having an eye 
examination 
   
First birth = boy -0.010  
 (0.012)  
Fine in years of income  -0.040 
  (0.041) 
Constant 1.54 1.67 
 (1.14) (1.16) 
County/district fixed effect Yes Yes 
Observations 7,109 6,936 
R-squared 0.372 0.361 
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator of having an eye examination. Only the 7th graders 
report whether they have had eye examinations recently. The regressions are thus based on the 
sample of the 7th graders. All regressions include both individual and household characteristics. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A.2  Severe nearsightedness 
 (1) (2) 
Variables 7th Graders 9th Graders 
   
Only-child 0.0023 0.023* 
 (0.0039) (0.013) 
Constant 0.092 -0.11 
 (0.15) (0.20) 
   
Observations 7,060 6,961 
R-squared 0.009 0.005 
County/district fixed effects Yes Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator of having severe nearsightedness (-6.00 diopters or 
higher). Only the 7th graders report whether they wear glasses or not. The regressions are thus 
based on the sample of the 7th graders. All regressions include both individual and household 
characteristics. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 
